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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1877Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Brandts, Jordi | - |
| dc.creator | Güth, Werner | - |
| dc.creator | Stiehler, Andreas | - |
| dc.date | 2007-11-06T08:37:17Z | - |
| dc.date | 2007-11-06T08:37:17Z | - |
| dc.date | 2002-05-15 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-01-31T00:58:04Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2017-01-31T00:58:04Z | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1877 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1877 | - |
| dc.description | Trabajo publicado como artículo en Labour Economics 13(1): 1-17 (2006) con el titulo "I want YOU! An experiment studying motivational effects when assigning distributive power".-- http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2004.08.003 | - |
| dc.description | We study whether selection affects motivation. In our experiment subjects first answer a personality questionnaire. They then play a 3-person game. One of the three players decides between an outside option assigning him a positive amount, but leaving the two others empty-handed and allowing one of the other two players to distribute a pie. Treatments differ in the procedure by which distributive power is assigned: to a randomly determined or to a knowingly selected partner. Before making her decision the selecting player could consult the personality questionnaire of the other two players. Results show that knowingly selected players keep less for themselves than randomly selected ones and reward the selecting player more generously. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.relation | UFAE and IAE Working Papers | - |
| dc.relation | 521.02 | - |
| dc.rights | openAccess | - |
| dc.title | I want YOU! An experiment studying the selection effect when assigning distributive power | - |
| dc.title | I want YOU! An experiment studying motivational effects when assigning distributive power | - |
| dc.type | Documento de trabajo | - |
| Appears in Collections: | Digital Csic | |
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