Stable Coalition Structures with Fixed Decision Scheme

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1932

Title:	Stable Coalition Structures with Fixed Decision Scheme
Keywords:	Coalition structures Tiebout equilibrium C-stability Decision scheme
Description:	This paper studies the stability of a finite local public goods economy in horizontal differentiation, where a jurisdiction's choice of the public good is given by an exogenous decision scheme. In this paper, we characterize the class of decision schemes that ensure the existence of an equilibrium with free mobility (that we call Tiebout equilibrium) for monotone distribution of players. This class contains all the decision schemes whose choice lies between the Rawlsian decision scheme and the median voter with mid-distance of the two median voters when there are ties. We show that for non-monotone distribution, there is no decision scheme that can ensure the stability of coalitions. In the last part of the paper, we prove the non-emptiness of the core of this coalition formation game
URI:	http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1932
Other Identifiers:	http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1932
Appears in Collections:	Digital Csic

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