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| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Protopopescu, Dan | - |
| dc.date | 2008-05-19T11:55:34Z | - |
| dc.date | 2008-05-19T11:55:34Z | - |
| dc.date | 2008-04-01 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-01-31T01:22:08Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2017-01-31T01:22:08Z | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/4345 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/4345 | - |
| dc.description | Submitted for publication to the Journal of Economic Theory. | - |
| dc.description | The objective of this paper is to re-evaluate the attitude to effort of a risk-averse decision-maker in an evolving environment. In the classic analysis, the space of efforts is generally discretized. More realistic, this new approach emploies a continuum of effort levels. The presence of multiple possible efforts and performance levels provides a better basis for explaining real economic phenomena. The traditional approach (see, Laffont, J. J. & Tirole, J., 1993, Salanie, B., 1997, Laffont, J.J. and Martimort, D, 2002, among others) does not take into account the potential effect of the system dynamics on the agent's behavior to effort over time. In the context of a Principal-agent relationship, not only the incentives of the Principal can determine the private agent to allocate a good effort, but also the evolution of the dynamic system. The incentives can be ineffective when the environment does not incite the agent to invest a good effort. This explain why, some efficient strategic incentive-compatible constraints that cover the entire period of contract do not generally exist. The present approach improves our understanding as regards the agent's psychology to effort as decision-maker. It provides new perspectives of research for theorists and empirical analysts. | - |
| dc.description | This article is based on research undertaken with support from European Community's PHARE ACE Programme 1998 under grant P98-2103-S. | - |
| dc.description | Peer reviewed | - |
| dc.format | 2850623 bytes | - |
| dc.format | application/pdf | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.relation | UFAE and IAE Working Papers | - |
| dc.relation | 739.08 | - |
| dc.rights | openAccess | - |
| dc.subject | Optimal trajectory | - |
| dc.subject | Closed-loop strategy | - |
| dc.subject | Controlled stochastic environment | - |
| dc.subject | Rational decision-maker | - |
| dc.subject | Endogenous dynamic active learning | - |
| dc.subject | Adaptive effort management | - |
| dc.subject | Optimal effort threshold | - |
| dc.subject | Effort aversion | - |
| dc.subject | Excessive behavior | - |
| dc.subject | Learning of preferences | - |
| dc.title | Improving the Effort Concept: A Revision of the Traditional Approach in the Context of Controlled Dynamic Stochastic Environments | - |
| dc.type | Documento de trabajo | - |
| Appears in Collections: | Digital Csic | |
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