Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/17833| Title: | Complementarities in Corporate Governance: Ownership Concentration, Capital Structure, Monitoring and Pecuniary Incentives |
| Keywords: | G30 D23 ddc:330 Corporate governance Complementarity Agency problem Corporate Governance Agency Theory Opportunitätskosten Anreizvertrag Kontrolle Eigentümerstruktur Kapitalstruktur Leistungsorientierte Vergütung Theorie Deutschland Japan Vereinigte Staaten |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Kiel |
| Description: | The paper shows that, as owners accumulate larger stakes and hence become less risk-tolerant, their incentives to monitor management are attenuated because monitoring shifts some of the firm?s risk from management to owners. This counterbalances the positive effect which more concentrated ownership has on monitoring via reduced free rider problems. Moreover, the paper shows how the opportunity cost of concentrated ownership, which is the loss of risk-sharing benefits, creates scope to use leverage as an additional complementary governance instrument. The paper offers new explanations for several empirical regularities found in the literature. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/17833 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/17833 ppn:311588549 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.