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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18681| Title: | Incentives and anonymity principle : crowding out toward users |
| Keywords: | L32 J45 J33 C9 M5 ddc:330 incentives anonymity principle egalitarian tasks allocation principal agent user relationship crowding-out effect Öffentliche Dienstleistung Dienstleistungsqualität Leistungsorientierte Vergütung Agency Theory Crowding out Verbraucher Spieltheorie Theorie Pencil-Pusher Game |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Description: | In our model, an agent produces an outcome by a costly effort and then distributes it among heterogeneous users. The agent?s payoff is the weighted sum of the users? shares and the coefficient reflecting their heterogeneity. When the agent neglects users? heterogeneity the game leads to an anonymous allocation. Otherwise, the equilibrium distribution is non- egalitarian but more efficient. Low performing agents reduce inequality among users by delivering an egalitarian service, while intermediate or high performing agents tend to prefer (but not always) delivering an unequal service, thereby breaking the anonymity principle. Incentives do matter regarding the crowding effect toward users. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18681 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18681 ppn:477390900 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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