Regional grants as pork barrel politics

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18817

Full metadata record

DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Milligan, Kevin	-
dc.creator	Smart, Michael	-
dc.date	2005	-
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-16T07:01:28Z	-
dc.date.available	2013-10-16T07:01:28Z	-
dc.date.issued	2013-10-16	-
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18817	-
dc.identifier	ppn:485190125	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18817	-
dc.description	We investigate the political and economic factors influencing the allocation of regional development grants for a panel of Canadian electoral districts in the 1988-2001 period. In a strong party system such as Canada?s, models of political competition predict little role for individual legislators, as party leaders allocate resources to maximize party success. While spending is targeted toward some ?swing? districts, we do also find it is higher in districts represented by members of the government party, especially those in the federal Cabinet, and those of lower seniority. We develop a model featuring bargaining over legislative and nonlegislative favours that is consistent with the evidence.	-
dc.language	eng	-
dc.publisher		-
dc.relation	CESifo working papers 1453	-
dc.rights	http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen	-
dc.subject	H25	-
dc.subject	D72	-
dc.subject	R58	-
dc.subject	ddc:330	-
dc.subject	Regionalpolitik	-
dc.subject	Regierung	-
dc.subject	Verhandlungen	-
dc.subject	Public Choice	-
dc.subject	Kanada	-
dc.title	Regional grants as pork barrel politics	-
dc.type	doc-type:workingPaper	-
Appears in Collections:	EconStor

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