1. DSpace at MEDIU
  2. Harvested articles مقالات مستوردة من مؤسسات وجامعات عالمية
  3. EconStor
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19127
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.creatorMiettinen, Topi-
dc.creatorPoutvaara, Panu-
dc.date2006-
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-16T07:03:02Z-
dc.date.available2013-10-16T07:03:02Z-
dc.date.issued2013-10-16-
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19127-
dc.identifierppn:510019129-
dc.identifier.urihttp://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19127-
dc.descriptionWe argue that anticorruption laws may provide an efficiency rationale for why political parties should meddle in the distribution of political nominations and government contracts. Anticorruption laws forbid trade in spoils that politicians distribute. However, citizens may pay for gaining access to politicians and, thereby, to become potential candidates for nominations. Such rent-seeking results in excessive network formation. Political parties may reduce wasteful network formation, thanks to their ability to enter into exclusive membership contracts. This holds even though anticorruption laws also bind political parties.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisher-
dc.relationCESifo working papers 1663-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.subjectL14-
dc.subjectD85-
dc.subjectD72-
dc.subjectddc:330-
dc.subjectpolitical parties-
dc.subjecttwo-sided platforms-
dc.subjectrent-seeking-
dc.subjectnetwork formation-
dc.subjectPatronage-
dc.subjectRent Seeking-
dc.subjectSoziales Netzwerk-
dc.subjectPolitische Partei-
dc.subjectKlubtheorie-
dc.subjectTheorie-
dc.titlePolitical parties and network formation-
dc.typedoc-type:workingPaper-
Appears in Collections:EconStor

Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Show simple item record


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.