Lobbying and political polarization

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19354

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Ursprung, Heinrich W.	-
dc.date	2002	-
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-16T07:04:24Z	-
dc.date.available	2013-10-16T07:04:24Z	-
dc.date.issued	2013-10-16	-
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19354	-
dc.identifier	ppn:349218781	-
dc.identifier	RePEc:zbw:hwwadp:26219	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19354	-
dc.description	Standard spatial models of political competition give rise to equilibria in which the competing political parties or candidates converge to a common position. In this paper I show how political polarization can be generated in models that focus on the nexus between pre-election interest group lobbying and electoral competition.	-
dc.language	eng	-
dc.publisher		-
dc.relation	HWWA Discussion Paper 193	-
dc.rights	http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen	-
dc.subject	D72	-
dc.subject	ddc:330	-
dc.subject	political competition	-
dc.subject	lobbying	-
dc.subject	interest groups	-
dc.subject	campaign contributions	-
dc.subject	Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie	-
dc.subject	Interessenpolitik	-
dc.subject	Wahlkampffinanzierung	-
dc.subject	Theorie	-
dc.title	Lobbying and political polarization	-
dc.type	doc-type:workingPaper	-
Appears in Collections:	EconStor

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