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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19354| Title: | Lobbying and political polarization |
| Keywords: | D72 ddc:330 political competition lobbying interest groups campaign contributions Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie Interessenpolitik Wahlkampffinanzierung Theorie |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | |
| Description: | Standard spatial models of political competition give rise to equilibria in which the competing political parties or candidates converge to a common position. In this paper I show how political polarization can be generated in models that focus on the nexus between pre-election interest group lobbying and electoral competition. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19354 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19354 ppn:349218781 RePEc:zbw:hwwadp:26219 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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