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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19506| Title: | Optimal lender of last resort policy in different financial systems |
| Keywords: | D52 E44 G21 E52 E58 ddc:330 Financial Crises Lender of Last Resort Comparing Financial Systems Lender of Last Resort Finanzmarkt Wirtschaftspolitische Wirkungsanalyse |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Description: | In a framework closely related to Diamond and Rajan (2001) we characterize different financial systems and analyze the welfare implications of different LOLR-policies in these financial systems. We show that in a bank-dominated financial system it is less likely that a LOLR-policy that follows the Bagehot rules is preferable. In financial systems with rather illiquid assets a discretionary individual liquidity assistance might be welfare improving, while in market-based financial systems, with rather liquid assets in the banks' balance sheets, emergency liquidity assistance provided freely to the market at a penalty rate is likely to be efficient. Thus, a "one size fits all"-approach that does not take the differences of financial systems into account is misguiding. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19506 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19506 ppn:477279619 RePEc:zbw:bubdp1:2917 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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