Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19681
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dc.creatorStähler, Nikolai-
dc.date2007-
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-16T07:06:16Z-
dc.date.available2013-10-16T07:06:16Z-
dc.date.issued2013-10-16-
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19681-
dc.identifierppn:527587257-
dc.identifierRePEc:zbw:bubdp1:5558-
dc.identifier.urihttp://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19681-
dc.descriptionIn theoretical literature, the effects of employment protection on unemployment are ambiguous. Higher employment protection decreases job creation as well as job destruction. However, in most models, wages are bargained individually between workers and firms. Using a conventional matching model in which a monopoly union sets wages, I show that employment protection can unambiguously increase unemployment. Interestingly, I find that tightening the restrictions on redundancies and dismissals may even increase the probability of dismissal.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relationDiscussion paper Series 1 / Volkswirtschaftliches Forschungszentrum der Deutschen Bundesbank 2007,04-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.subjectJ68-
dc.subjectJ65-
dc.subjectJ64-
dc.subjectJ41-
dc.subjectddc:330-
dc.subjectemployment protection-
dc.subjectsearch and matching models-
dc.subjectunemployment-
dc.subjectunions-
dc.subjectKündigungsschutz-
dc.subjectWirtschaftspolitische Wirkungsanalyse-
dc.subjectBeschäftigungseffekt-
dc.subjectArbeitslosigkeit-
dc.subjectLohnverhandlungstheorie-
dc.subjectGewerkschaftlicher Organisationsgrad-
dc.subjectTheorie-
dc.titleUnemployment and employment protection in a unionized economy with search frictions-
dc.typedoc-type:workingPaper-
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