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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19681| Title: | Unemployment and employment protection in a unionized economy with search frictions |
| Keywords: | J68 J65 J64 J41 ddc:330 employment protection search and matching models unemployment unions Kündigungsschutz Wirtschaftspolitische Wirkungsanalyse Beschäftigungseffekt Arbeitslosigkeit Lohnverhandlungstheorie Gewerkschaftlicher Organisationsgrad Theorie |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Description: | In theoretical literature, the effects of employment protection on unemployment are ambiguous. Higher employment protection decreases job creation as well as job destruction. However, in most models, wages are bargained individually between workers and firms. Using a conventional matching model in which a monopoly union sets wages, I show that employment protection can unambiguously increase unemployment. Interestingly, I find that tightening the restrictions on redundancies and dismissals may even increase the probability of dismissal. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19681 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19681 ppn:527587257 RePEc:zbw:bubdp1:5558 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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