Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19742
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.creatorKoetter, Michael-
dc.creatorBos, Jaap W. B.-
dc.creatorHeid, Frank-
dc.creatorKool, Clemens J. M.-
dc.creatorKolari, James W.-
dc.creatorPorath, Daniel-
dc.date2005-
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-16T07:06:35Z-
dc.date.available2013-10-16T07:06:35Z-
dc.date.issued2013-10-16-
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19742-
dc.identifierppn:503997730-
dc.identifierRePEc:zbw:bubdp2:4264-
dc.identifier.urihttp://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19742-
dc.descriptionThe inability of most bank merger studies to control for hidden bailouts may lead to biased results. In this study, we employ a unique data set of approximately 1,000 mergers to analyze the determinants of bank mergers. We use data on the regulatory intervention history to distinguish between distressed and non-distressed mergers. We find that, among merging banks, distressed banks had the worst profiles and acquirers perform somewhat better than targets. However, both distressed and non-distressed mergers have worse CAMEL profiles than our control group. In fact, non-distressed mergers may be motivated by the desire to forestall serious future financial distress and prevent regulatory intervention.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relationDiscussion Paper, Series 2: Banking and Financial Supervision 2005,09-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.subjectG21-
dc.subjectG14-
dc.subjectG34-
dc.subjectddc:330-
dc.subjectMergers-
dc.subjectbailout-
dc.subjectX-efficiency-
dc.subjectmultinomial logit-
dc.subjectBank-
dc.subjectFusion-
dc.subjectÜbernahme-
dc.subjectUnternehmenssanierung-
dc.subjectBankinsolvenz-
dc.subjectSchätzung-
dc.subjectDeutschland-
dc.titleAccounting for distress in bank mergers-
dc.typedoc-type:workingPaper-
Appears in Collections:EconStor

Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.