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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19742| Title: | Accounting for distress in bank mergers |
| Keywords: | G21 G14 G34 ddc:330 Mergers bailout X-efficiency multinomial logit Bank Fusion Übernahme Unternehmenssanierung Bankinsolvenz Schätzung Deutschland |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Description: | The inability of most bank merger studies to control for hidden bailouts may lead to biased results. In this study, we employ a unique data set of approximately 1,000 mergers to analyze the determinants of bank mergers. We use data on the regulatory intervention history to distinguish between distressed and non-distressed mergers. We find that, among merging banks, distressed banks had the worst profiles and acquirers perform somewhat better than targets. However, both distressed and non-distressed mergers have worse CAMEL profiles than our control group. In fact, non-distressed mergers may be motivated by the desire to forestall serious future financial distress and prevent regulatory intervention. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19742 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19742 ppn:503997730 RePEc:zbw:bubdp2:4264 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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