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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19799Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Hainz, Christa | - |
| dc.creator | Boerner, Kira | - |
| dc.date | 2005 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-10-16T07:06:51Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-10-16T07:06:51Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-10-16 | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19799 | - |
| dc.identifier | ppn:500742979 | - |
| dc.identifier | RePEc:zbw:gdec05:3479 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19799 | - |
| dc.description | In transition and developing countries, we observe rather high levels of corruption even they have democratic political systems. This is surprising from a political economy perspective, as a majority of the people generally suffers from high corruption levels. Our model based on the fact that corrupt officials have to pay an entry fee to get lucrative positions. In a probabilistic voting model, we show that a lack of financial institutions can lead more corruption as more voters are part of the corrupt system. Well-functioning financial institutions, in turn, can increase the political support for anti-corruption measures. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | - | |
| dc.relation | Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Kiel 2005 / Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics 6 | - |
| dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | - |
| dc.subject | D72 | - |
| dc.subject | O17 | - |
| dc.subject | D73 | - |
| dc.subject | ddc:330 | - |
| dc.subject | Corruption | - |
| dc.subject | Financial Markets | - |
| dc.subject | Institutions | - |
| dc.subject | Development | - |
| dc.subject | Voting | - |
| dc.title | The Political Economy of Corruption and and the Role of Financial Institutions | - |
| dc.type | doc-type:conferenceObject | - |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor | |
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