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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19799| Title: | The Political Economy of Corruption and and the Role of Financial Institutions |
| Keywords: | D72 O17 D73 ddc:330 Corruption Financial Markets Institutions Development Voting |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | |
| Description: | In transition and developing countries, we observe rather high levels of corruption even they have democratic political systems. This is surprising from a political economy perspective, as a majority of the people generally suffers from high corruption levels. Our model based on the fact that corrupt officials have to pay an entry fee to get lucrative positions. In a probabilistic voting model, we show that a lack of financial institutions can lead more corruption as more voters are part of the corrupt system. Well-functioning financial institutions, in turn, can increase the political support for anti-corruption measures. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19799 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19799 ppn:500742979 RePEc:zbw:gdec05:3479 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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