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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19811Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Hainz, Christa | - |
| dc.date | 2005 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-10-16T07:06:54Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-10-16T07:06:54Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-10-16 | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19811 | - |
| dc.identifier | ppn:500758492 | - |
| dc.identifier | RePEc:zbw:gdec05:3491 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19811 | - |
| dc.description | The number of firm bankruptcies is surprisingly low in economies with poor institutions. We study a model of bank-firm relationship and show that the bank?s decision to liquidate bad firms has two opposing effects. First, the bank receives a payoff if a firm is liquidated. Second, it loses the rent from incumbent customers that is due to its informational advantage. We show that institutions must improve significantly in order to yield a stable equilibrium in which the optimal number of firms is liquidated. There is also a range where improving institutions may decrease the number of bad firms liquidated. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | - | |
| dc.relation | Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Kiel 2005 / Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics 18 | - |
| dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | - |
| dc.subject | G33 | - |
| dc.subject | K10 | - |
| dc.subject | G21 | - |
| dc.subject | D82 | - |
| dc.subject | ddc:330 | - |
| dc.subject | Credit markets | - |
| dc.subject | institutions | - |
| dc.subject | bank competition | - |
| dc.subject | information sharing | - |
| dc.subject | bankruptcy | - |
| dc.subject | relationship banking | - |
| dc.title | Quality of Institutions, Credit Markets and Bankruptcy | - |
| dc.type | doc-type:conferenceObject | - |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor | |
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