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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19869| Title: | Default, Electoral Uncertainty and the Choice of Exchange Regime |
| Keywords: | F33 F34 ddc:330 debt crisis currency crisis exchange rate regime Finanzmarktkrise Auslandsverschuldung Zahlungsunfähigkeit Wechselkurssystem Public Choice Währungskrise Theorie |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | |
| Description: | The paper explores the interaction between debt crises and devaluation. Since the optimal level of devaluation in a crisis depends on the level of debt that has to be serviced, a default makes a devaluation less likely. Expected devaluation depends thus on expectations about default which is also a function of the type of policymaker. Therefore, the decision to devalue can be forced upon the government by adverse expectations about default and the type of policymaker in office. I also explore how these uncertainties affect the policymaker?s choice of exchange rate regime. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19869 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19869 ppn:560905467 RePEc:zbw:gdec07:6536 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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