Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20025| Title: | A small Fish War: an example with frequency-dependent stage payoffs |
| Keywords: | C73 C72 Q22 Q20 ddc:330 games with frequency-dependent stage payoffs limiting average reward equilibria renewable common-pool resources Allmenderessource Erneuerbare Ressourcen Nichtkooperatives Spiel Dynamisches Spiel Theorie |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | |
| Description: | Two agents possess the fishing rights to a lake. Each period they have two options, to catch without restraint, e.g., to use a fine-mazed net, or to catch with some restraint, e.g., to use a wide-mazed net. The use of a fine-mazed net always yields a higher immediate catch than the alternative. The present catches depend on the behavior of the agents in the past. The more often the agents have used the fine- mazed net in the past, the lower the present catches are independent from the type of nets being used. We determine feasible rewards and provide (subgame perfect) equi- libria for the limiting average reward criterion using methods inspired by the repeated-games literature. Our analysis shows that a 'tragedy of the commons' can be averted, as sustainable Pareto-efficient outcomes can be supported by subgame perfect equilibria. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20025 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20025 ppn:495265225 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.