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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20025Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Joosten, Reinoud | - |
| dc.date | 2005 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-10-16T07:08:07Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-10-16T07:08:07Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-10-16 | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20025 | - |
| dc.identifier | ppn:495265225 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20025 | - |
| dc.description | Two agents possess the fishing rights to a lake. Each period they have two options, to catch without restraint, e.g., to use a fine-mazed net, or to catch with some restraint, e.g., to use a wide-mazed net. The use of a fine-mazed net always yields a higher immediate catch than the alternative. The present catches depend on the behavior of the agents in the past. The more often the agents have used the fine- mazed net in the past, the lower the present catches are independent from the type of nets being used. We determine feasible rewards and provide (subgame perfect) equi- libria for the limiting average reward criterion using methods inspired by the repeated-games literature. Our analysis shows that a 'tragedy of the commons' can be averted, as sustainable Pareto-efficient outcomes can be supported by subgame perfect equilibria. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | - | |
| dc.relation | Papers on economics & evolution 0506 | - |
| dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | - |
| dc.subject | C73 | - |
| dc.subject | C72 | - |
| dc.subject | Q22 | - |
| dc.subject | Q20 | - |
| dc.subject | ddc:330 | - |
| dc.subject | games with frequency-dependent stage payoffs | - |
| dc.subject | limiting average reward | - |
| dc.subject | equilibria | - |
| dc.subject | renewable common-pool resources | - |
| dc.subject | Allmenderessource | - |
| dc.subject | Erneuerbare Ressourcen | - |
| dc.subject | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | - |
| dc.subject | Dynamisches Spiel | - |
| dc.subject | Theorie | - |
| dc.title | A small Fish War: an example with frequency-dependent stage payoffs | - |
| dc.type | doc-type:workingPaper | - |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor | |
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