Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20038
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dc.creatorPalokangas, Tapio-
dc.date2003-
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-16T07:08:11Z-
dc.date.available2013-10-16T07:08:11Z-
dc.date.issued2013-10-16-
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20038-
dc.identifierppn:365983624-
dc.identifier.urihttp://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20038-
dc.descriptionThis document examines foreign direct investment (FDI) when multinationals and labour unions bargain over labour contracts and lobby the self-interested government for taxation and labour market regulation. We demonstrate that right-to-manage bargaining predicts higher returns for FDI than does non-unionization or efficient bargaining. This advantage is further magnified in the presence of credible wage contracts. When the labour market is nonunionized, or there is a bargain over employment, the ruling elite reaps the surplus of FDI through taxation or regulation. In the absence of credible contracts, unions have incentives to claim a bigger share of the revenue of FDI.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisher-
dc.relationIZA Discussion paper series 793-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.subjectD78-
dc.subjectJ51-
dc.subjectF23-
dc.subjectF21-
dc.subjectddc:330-
dc.subjectforeign direct investment-
dc.subjectlabour market regulation-
dc.subjectlobbying-
dc.subjectDirektinvestition-
dc.subjectInvestitionsrisiko-
dc.subjectMultinationales Unternehmen-
dc.subjectGewerkschaftlicher Organisationsgrad-
dc.subjectLohnverhandlungstheorie-
dc.subjectInteressenpolitik-
dc.subjectArbeitsmarktflexibilisierung-
dc.subjectStandortfaktor-
dc.subjectTheorie-
dc.titleForeign Direct Investment, Labour Market Regulation and Self-Interested Governments-
dc.typedoc-type:workingPaper-
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