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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20038| Title: | Foreign Direct Investment, Labour Market Regulation and Self-Interested Governments |
| Keywords: | D78 J51 F23 F21 ddc:330 foreign direct investment labour market regulation lobbying Direktinvestition Investitionsrisiko Multinationales Unternehmen Gewerkschaftlicher Organisationsgrad Lohnverhandlungstheorie Interessenpolitik Arbeitsmarktflexibilisierung Standortfaktor Theorie |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | |
| Description: | This document examines foreign direct investment (FDI) when multinationals and labour unions bargain over labour contracts and lobby the self-interested government for taxation and labour market regulation. We demonstrate that right-to-manage bargaining predicts higher returns for FDI than does non-unionization or efficient bargaining. This advantage is further magnified in the presence of credible wage contracts. When the labour market is nonunionized, or there is a bargain over employment, the ruling elite reaps the surplus of FDI through taxation or regulation. In the absence of credible contracts, unions have incentives to claim a bigger share of the revenue of FDI. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20038 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20038 ppn:365983624 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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