Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20084
Title: Equilibrium Unemployment Under Negotiated Profit Sharing
Keywords: J41
G32
J51
ddc:330
bargaining
profit sharing
efficiency wages
equilibrium unemployment
Tarifliche Gewinnbeteiligung
Lohnverhandlungstheorie
Effizienzlohn
Theorie der Arbeitslosigkeit
Arbeitsmarktflexibilisierung
Theorie
Issue Date: 16-Oct-2013
Publisher: 
Description: We study employment, employee effort, wages and profit sharing when firms face stochastic revenue shocks and when base wages and profit shares are determined through negotiations. The negotiated profit share depends positively on the relative bargaining power of the trade union and it has effort-enhancing and wage-moderating effects. We show that higher profit sharing reduces equilibrium unemployment under circumstances with sufficiently ?rigid? labour market institutions, i.e. sufficiently high benefit-replacement ratios and relative bargaining powers of trade unions. Conversely, profit sharing seems to be destructive from the point of view of employment when the labour market ?rigidities? are sufficiently small.
URI: http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20084
Other Identifiers: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20084
ppn:368832236
Appears in Collections:EconStor

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