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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20120| Title: | Employment Protection and Product Market Regulation |
| Keywords: | L16 J65 J63 ddc:330 collective dismissal cost political economy Kündigungsschutz Regulierung Monopolistischer Wettbewerb Kündigung Kosten Insider-Outsider-Modell Theorie |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | |
| Description: | Product market regulation and employment protection are highly correlated across OECD countries. Using an augmented model of monopolistic competition we show why in countries with more regulated product markets, incumbent workers prefer to protect jobs relatively more. Product market regulation increases the scope for employment protection because firms can bear the cost of employment protection more easily and still break even. Moreover, product market regulation decreases employment so that the workers' outside option becomes relatively worse. This increases the incentive to protect the job. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20120 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20120 ppn:371982480 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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