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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20126| Title: | Transparency and Reciprocal Behavior in Employment Relations |
| Keywords: | C72 J33 C91 ddc:330 transparency reciprocity reputation gift exchange inequity aversion Arbeitsvertrag Agency Theory Nichtkooperatives Spiel Gerechtigkeit Experiment Theorie |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | |
| Description: | The impact of transparency on the extent of reciprocal behavior is investigated in a simple repeated gift exchange experiment, where principals set wages and agents respond by choosing effort levels. In addition to the efforts the principals? payoffs are determined by a random component. It is shown that direct reciprocal behavior is much stronger in a more transparent situation where efforts are revealed to the principals. However, there is no significant impact of transparency on average effort as non-transparency leads to a stronger diversity in behavioral patterns such that at the same time the frequency of very low and very large effort levels increases. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20126 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20126 ppn:371985439 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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