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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20126Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Irlenbusch, Bernd | - |
| dc.creator | Sliwka, Dirk | - |
| dc.date | 2003 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-10-16T07:08:50Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-10-16T07:08:50Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-10-16 | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20126 | - |
| dc.identifier | ppn:371985439 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20126 | - |
| dc.description | The impact of transparency on the extent of reciprocal behavior is investigated in a simple repeated gift exchange experiment, where principals set wages and agents respond by choosing effort levels. In addition to the efforts the principals? payoffs are determined by a random component. It is shown that direct reciprocal behavior is much stronger in a more transparent situation where efforts are revealed to the principals. However, there is no significant impact of transparency on average effort as non-transparency leads to a stronger diversity in behavioral patterns such that at the same time the frequency of very low and very large effort levels increases. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | - | |
| dc.relation | IZA Discussion paper series 887 | - |
| dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | - |
| dc.subject | C72 | - |
| dc.subject | J33 | - |
| dc.subject | C91 | - |
| dc.subject | ddc:330 | - |
| dc.subject | transparency | - |
| dc.subject | reciprocity | - |
| dc.subject | reputation | - |
| dc.subject | gift exchange | - |
| dc.subject | inequity aversion | - |
| dc.subject | Arbeitsvertrag | - |
| dc.subject | Agency Theory | - |
| dc.subject | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | - |
| dc.subject | Gerechtigkeit | - |
| dc.subject | Experiment | - |
| dc.subject | Theorie | - |
| dc.title | Transparency and Reciprocal Behavior in Employment Relations | - |
| dc.type | doc-type:workingPaper | - |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor | |
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