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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20183| Title: | Potential, prizes and performance : testing tournament theory with professional tennis data |
| Keywords: | M12 J33 J41 ddc:330 elimination tournaments uneven tournaments incentives in tournaments tennis Leistungsmotivation Wettbewerb Leistungsanreiz Agency Theory Schätzung Theorie Welt Tournament |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | |
| Description: | This paper tests two hypotheses from the theory of elimination tournaments: (i) that uneven tournaments, where the contestants are ex ante heterogeneous, entail lower effort exertion; this is a prediction from agency theory that has not been tested empirically before; and (ii) whether incentives set through prizes matter for effort exertion; this assumption underlies any agency theory about elimination tournaments, and has been empirically tested in other contexts. The evidence obtained with data from professional tennis tournaments supports both the assumption that incentives matter, as well as the theoretical implications concerning uneven tournaments among heterogeneous contestants. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20183 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20183 ppn:374930333 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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