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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20204Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Blázquez, Maite | - |
| dc.creator | Jansen, Marcel | - |
| dc.date | 2003 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-10-16T07:09:20Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-10-16T07:09:20Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-10-16 | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20204 | - |
| dc.identifier | ppn:377473693 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20204 | - |
| dc.description | This paper analyses the efficiency of the equilibrium allocation in a matching model with two types of workers and jobs. The basic assumption is that high-skill workers can perform both skilled and unskilled jobs, while low-skill workers can only perform unskilled jobs. Our first result shows that the equilibrium with ex-post bargaining is never efficient. Second, under Hosios? (1990) condition we show that high-skill workers are under-valued in equilibrium, while the opposite holds for low-skill workers. Firms therefore tend to create too few unskilled jobs, resulting in a suboptimally high unemployment rate for low-skill workers. We show that these results generalize to environments with more types of agents and different production technologies. Finally, in an extension we derive a tax scheme that restores efficiency and we show how workers? bargaining strength affects unemployment and skill-mismatch. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.relation | IZA Discussion paper series 968 | - |
| dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | - |
| dc.subject | D61 | - |
| dc.subject | C78 | - |
| dc.subject | J64 | - |
| dc.subject | ddc:330 | - |
| dc.subject | matching | - |
| dc.subject | ex post bargaining | - |
| dc.subject | heterogeneity | - |
| dc.subject | efficiency | - |
| dc.subject | Arbeitsmarkttheorie | - |
| dc.subject | Matching | - |
| dc.subject | Qualifikation | - |
| dc.subject | Verhandlungstheorie | - |
| dc.subject | Hochqualifizierte Arbeitskräfte | - |
| dc.subject | Ungelernte Arbeitskräfte | - |
| dc.subject | Allokationseffizienz | - |
| dc.subject | Theorie | - |
| dc.title | Efficiency in a matching model with heterogeneous agents : too many good or bad jobs? | - |
| dc.type | doc-type:workingPaper | - |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor | |
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