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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20204| Title: | Efficiency in a matching model with heterogeneous agents : too many good or bad jobs? |
| Keywords: | D61 C78 J64 ddc:330 matching ex post bargaining heterogeneity efficiency Arbeitsmarkttheorie Matching Qualifikation Verhandlungstheorie Hochqualifizierte Arbeitskräfte Ungelernte Arbeitskräfte Allokationseffizienz Theorie |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Description: | This paper analyses the efficiency of the equilibrium allocation in a matching model with two types of workers and jobs. The basic assumption is that high-skill workers can perform both skilled and unskilled jobs, while low-skill workers can only perform unskilled jobs. Our first result shows that the equilibrium with ex-post bargaining is never efficient. Second, under Hosios? (1990) condition we show that high-skill workers are under-valued in equilibrium, while the opposite holds for low-skill workers. Firms therefore tend to create too few unskilled jobs, resulting in a suboptimally high unemployment rate for low-skill workers. We show that these results generalize to environments with more types of agents and different production technologies. Finally, in an extension we derive a tax scheme that restores efficiency and we show how workers? bargaining strength affects unemployment and skill-mismatch. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20204 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20204 ppn:377473693 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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