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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20245| Title: | Re-Employment Bonuses in a Signalling Model of Temporary Layoffs |
| Keywords: | J63 J65 J64 ddc:330 temporary layoffs recall expectations unemployment signalling and re-employment bonus demonstrations Friktionelle Arbeitslosigkeit Arbeitsproduktivität Signalling Arbeitsmarktpolitik Arbeitsuche Theorie |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Description: | Temporary layoffs are an important feature of the United States labor market. If these employer-employee relationships exist because of valuable job-matches, unemployment among high-productivity laid-off workers may be optimal from societal perspective. However, because of asymmetric information, low-productivity workers may behave strategically, and choose unemployment instead of low-wage jobs, resulting in an inefficient level of unemployment. This paper shows that in such cases, a re-employment bonus may give the correct incentives to laid-off workers and achieve the optimal equilibrium. The paper analyzes the equity properties of such a policy and its cost effectiveness. Finally, the model fits the data and offers several policy implications. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20245 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20245 ppn:378764985 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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