Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20245
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dc.creatorRodríguez-Planas, Núria-
dc.date2004-
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-16T07:09:30Z-
dc.date.available2013-10-16T07:09:30Z-
dc.date.issued2013-10-16-
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20245-
dc.identifierppn:378764985-
dc.identifier.urihttp://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20245-
dc.descriptionTemporary layoffs are an important feature of the United States labor market. If these employer-employee relationships exist because of valuable job-matches, unemployment among high-productivity laid-off workers may be optimal from societal perspective. However, because of asymmetric information, low-productivity workers may behave strategically, and choose unemployment instead of low-wage jobs, resulting in an inefficient level of unemployment. This paper shows that in such cases, a re-employment bonus may give the correct incentives to laid-off workers and achieve the optimal equilibrium. The paper analyzes the equity properties of such a policy and its cost effectiveness. Finally, the model fits the data and offers several policy implications.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relationIZA Discussion paper series 1010-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.subjectJ63-
dc.subjectJ65-
dc.subjectJ64-
dc.subjectddc:330-
dc.subjecttemporary layoffs-
dc.subjectrecall expectations-
dc.subjectunemployment-
dc.subjectsignalling and re-employment bonus demonstrations-
dc.subjectFriktionelle Arbeitslosigkeit-
dc.subjectArbeitsproduktivität-
dc.subjectSignalling-
dc.subjectArbeitsmarktpolitik-
dc.subjectArbeitsuche-
dc.subjectTheorie-
dc.titleRe-Employment Bonuses in a Signalling Model of Temporary Layoffs-
dc.typedoc-type:workingPaper-
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