Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20255
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dc.creatorKoskela, Erkki-
dc.creatorStenbacka, Rune-
dc.date2004-
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-16T07:09:36Z-
dc.date.available2013-10-16T07:09:36Z-
dc.date.issued2013-10-16-
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20255-
dc.identifierppn:378963260-
dc.identifier.urihttp://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20255-
dc.descriptionWe investigate the interaction between labour and credit market imperfections for equilibrium unemployment in the presence of profit sharing. In a partial equilibrium with exogenous outside options increased bargaining power of banks has adverse employment effects. In a general equilibrium with endogenous outside options this relationship is frequently reversed; reduced credit market imperfections increase equilibrium unemployment if the labour market imperfections – measured by the bargaining power of trade unions - are sufficiently strong and benefit-replacement ratio high enough. Finally, we show that higher bankruptcy risks increase equilibrium unemployment under similar conditions.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisher-
dc.relationIZA Discussion paper series 1020-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.subjectG32-
dc.subjectJ41-
dc.subjectJ51-
dc.subjectddc:330-
dc.subjectwage and loan bargaining-
dc.subjectcompensation systems-
dc.subjectequilibrium unemployment-
dc.subjectoutside options-
dc.subjectTheorie der Arbeitslosigkeit-
dc.subjectGleichgewicht-
dc.subjectTarifliche Gewinnbeteiligung-
dc.subjectKreditmarkt-
dc.subjectUnvollkommener Markt-
dc.subjectLohnverhandlungstheorie-
dc.subjectTheorie-
dc.titleProfit Sharing, Credit Market Imperfections and Equilibrium Unemployment-
dc.typedoc-type:workingPaper-
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