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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20292| Title: | Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger : An Experiment with Managers and Students |
| Keywords: | C81 M52 J33 C92 ddc:330 executive and team-based compensation subject pool effects real effort experiment incentives sorting mergers Fusion Führungskräfte Leistungsanreiz Gruppenarbeit Experiment Pharmazeutische Industrie Deutschland Frankreich |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Description: | After a merger, company officials face the challenge of making compensation schemes uniform and of redesigning teams with managers from companies with different incentives, work habits and recruiting methods. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between executive pay and performance after a merger by dissociating the respective influence of shifts, which occur in both compensation incentives and team composition. The results of a real effort experiment conducted with managers within a large pharmaceutical company not only show that changes in compensation incentives affect performance but also suggest that the sorting effect of incentives in the previous companies impact cooperation and efficiency after the merger. Replicating this experiment with students showed differences in strategy rather than in substance between the two groups of subjects with managers appearing performance driven while students are more cost driven. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20292 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20292 ppn:380949806 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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