Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20380
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dc.creatorGlazer, Amihai-
dc.creatorGersbach, Hans-
dc.date2004-
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-16T07:10:18Z-
dc.date.available2013-10-16T07:10:18Z-
dc.date.issued2013-10-16-
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20380-
dc.identifierppn:386980365-
dc.identifier.urihttp://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20380-
dc.descriptionWe consider a firm which pays a worker for his effort over several periods. The more the firm pays in one period, the wealthier the worker is in the following periods, and so the more he must be paid for a given effort. This wealth effect can induce an employer to pay little initially and more later on. For related reasons, the worker may work harder than the employer prefers. The incentive contracts firms offer may therefore cap the worker?s earnings. Lastly, this wealth ratchet effect can induce excessive firing and turnover.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisher-
dc.relationIZA Discussion paper series 1143-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.subjectJ60-
dc.subjectJ30-
dc.subjectD80-
dc.subjectddc:330-
dc.subjectprincipal-agent-
dc.subjectcompensation-
dc.subjectmoral hazard-
dc.subjectwealth effects-
dc.subjectRatchet effects-
dc.subjecthigh-powered incentives-
dc.subjectVergütungssystem-
dc.subjectAnreizvertrag-
dc.subjectLeistungsmotivation-
dc.subjectVermögenseffekt-
dc.subjectArbeitsmobilität-
dc.subjectAgency Theory-
dc.subjectTheorie-
dc.titleHigh Compensation Creates a Ratchet Effect-
dc.typedoc-type:workingPaper-
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