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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20419Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Hunt, Jennifer | - |
| dc.date | 2004 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-10-16T07:10:27Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-10-16T07:10:27Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-10-16 | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20419 | - |
| dc.identifier | ppn:389183512 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20419 | - |
| dc.description | I study data on bribes actually paid by individuals to public officials, viewing the results through a theoretical lens that considers the implications of trust networks. A bond of trust may permit an implicit quid pro quo to substitute for a bribe, which reduces corruption. Appropriate networks are more easily established in small towns, by long-term residents of areas with many other long-term residents, and by individuals in regions with many residents their own age. I confirm that the prevalence of bribery is lower under these circumstances, using the International Crime Victim Surveys. I also find that older people, who have had time to develop a network, bribe less. These results highlight the uphill nature of the battle against corruption faced by policy-makers in rapidly urbanizing countries with high fertility. I show that victims of (other) crimes bribe all types of public officials more than non-victims, and argue that both their victimization and bribery stem from a distrustful environment. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | - | |
| dc.relation | IZA Discussion paper series 1179 | - |
| dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | - |
| dc.subject | D6 | - |
| dc.subject | O1 | - |
| dc.subject | K4 | - |
| dc.subject | ddc:330 | - |
| dc.subject | networks | - |
| dc.subject | crime | - |
| dc.subject | corruption | - |
| dc.subject | Korruption | - |
| dc.subject | Vertrauen | - |
| dc.title | Trust and Bribery : The Role of the Quid Pro Quo and the Link with Crime | - |
| dc.type | doc-type:workingPaper | - |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor | |
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