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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20420| Title: | Legal Restrictions on Buyout Fees : Theory and Evidence from German Soccer |
| Keywords: | J41 L83 ddc:330 Labor contracts Bosman judgement empirical contract theory Sportler Fussballsport Arbeitsvertrag Lohn Abfindung Verhandlungstheorie Schätzung Deutschland |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | |
| Description: | We perform a theoretical and empirical analysis of the impact of transfer fee regulations on professional soccer in Europe. Based on a model on the interaction of moral hazard and heterogeneity, we show (i) how the regulations effect contract durations and wages, (ii) that contracting parties have an incentive to agree upon inefficiently long contracts, (iii) how these incentives vary with the legal system, and (iv) how the relationship between contract duration and performance also depends on the legal system. With one exception, all theoretical results are empirically confirmed using a comprehensive data set from the top German Soccer League ("Bundesliga"). |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20420 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20420 ppn:389184047 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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