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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20439| Title: | Deferred Compensation and Gift Exchange : An Experimental Investigation into Multi-Period Labor Markets |
| Keywords: | M51 J41 J31 C91 M52 ddc:330 deferred compensation pensions experimental labor economics personnel economics gift exchange incentives shirking Vergütungssystem Betriebliche Altersversorgung Betriebliche Sozialleistungen Leistungsanreiz Anreizvertrag Spieltheorie Experiment Theorie |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | |
| Description: | This paper examines the relationship between firms? wage offers and workers? supply of effort using a three-period experiment. In equilibrium, firms will offer deferred compensation: first period productivity is positive and wages are zero, while third period productivity is zero and wages are positive. The experiment produces strong evidence that deferred compensation increases worker effort; in about 70 percent of cases subjects supplied the optimal effort given the wage offer, and there was a strong effort response to future-period wages. We also find some evidence of gift exchange; worker players increased the effort levels in response to above equilibrium wage offers by a human, but not in response to similar offers by a computer. Finally, we find that firm players who are initially hesitant to defer compensation learn over time that it is beneficial to do so. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20439 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20439 ppn:390285358 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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