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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20439Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Wallace, Brian | - |
| dc.creator | Seltzer, Andrew J. | - |
| dc.creator | Huck, Steffen | - |
| dc.date | 2004 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-10-16T07:10:31Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-10-16T07:10:31Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-10-16 | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20439 | - |
| dc.identifier | ppn:390285358 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20439 | - |
| dc.description | This paper examines the relationship between firms? wage offers and workers? supply of effort using a three-period experiment. In equilibrium, firms will offer deferred compensation: first period productivity is positive and wages are zero, while third period productivity is zero and wages are positive. The experiment produces strong evidence that deferred compensation increases worker effort; in about 70 percent of cases subjects supplied the optimal effort given the wage offer, and there was a strong effort response to future-period wages. We also find some evidence of gift exchange; worker players increased the effort levels in response to above equilibrium wage offers by a human, but not in response to similar offers by a computer. Finally, we find that firm players who are initially hesitant to defer compensation learn over time that it is beneficial to do so. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | - | |
| dc.relation | IZA Discussion paper series 1193 | - |
| dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | - |
| dc.subject | M51 | - |
| dc.subject | J41 | - |
| dc.subject | J31 | - |
| dc.subject | C91 | - |
| dc.subject | M52 | - |
| dc.subject | ddc:330 | - |
| dc.subject | deferred compensation | - |
| dc.subject | pensions | - |
| dc.subject | experimental labor economics | - |
| dc.subject | personnel economics | - |
| dc.subject | gift exchange | - |
| dc.subject | incentives | - |
| dc.subject | shirking | - |
| dc.subject | Vergütungssystem | - |
| dc.subject | Betriebliche Altersversorgung | - |
| dc.subject | Betriebliche Sozialleistungen | - |
| dc.subject | Leistungsanreiz | - |
| dc.subject | Anreizvertrag | - |
| dc.subject | Spieltheorie | - |
| dc.subject | Experiment | - |
| dc.subject | Theorie | - |
| dc.title | Deferred Compensation and Gift Exchange : An Experimental Investigation into Multi-Period Labor Markets | - |
| dc.type | doc-type:workingPaper | - |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor | |
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