Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20441
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dc.creatorTakalo, Tuomas-
dc.creatorPoutvaara, Panu-
dc.date2004-
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-16T07:10:31Z-
dc.date.available2013-10-16T07:10:31Z-
dc.date.issued2013-10-16-
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20441-
dc.identifierppn:390562831-
dc.identifier.urihttp://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20441-
dc.descriptionWe analyze the topical question of how the compensation of elected politicians affects the set of citizens choosing to run. To this end, we develop a sparse and tractable citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with ability differences, informative campaigning and political parties. Our results suggest that primaries, campaign costs and rewards have previously overlooked interactions that should be studied in a unified framework. Surprisingly, increasing the reward may lower the average candidate quality when the campaigning costs are sufficiently high.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisher-
dc.relationIZA Discussion paper series 1195-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.subjectJ4-
dc.subjectD72-
dc.subjectJ24-
dc.subjectD70-
dc.subjectD79-
dc.subjectddc:330-
dc.subjectpoliticians' competence-
dc.subjectcareer concerns-
dc.subjectcampaigning costs-
dc.subjectrewards for elected officials-
dc.subjectcitizen-candidate models-
dc.subjectPolitiker-
dc.subjectKompetenz-
dc.subjectQualifikation-
dc.subjectDiäten-
dc.subjectWahlkampffinanzierung-
dc.subjectPublic Choice-
dc.subjectTheorie-
dc.titleCandidate Quality-
dc.typedoc-type:workingPaper-
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