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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20487| Title: | Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications |
| Keywords: | J41 D83 J64 ddc:330 job search directed search matching Arbeitsplatzsuchmodell Offene Stellen Matching Lohntheorie Theorie |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Description: | We analyze a model of directed search in which unemployed job seekers observe all posted wages. We allow for the possibility of multiple applications by workers and ex post competition among vacancies. For any number of applications, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which vacancies post a common wage. When workers apply to only one vacancy, a single wage is paid and the resulting equilibrium is efficient. When workers make multiple applications, there is dispersion in wages paid, and equilibrium may be inefficient. We show that our results also hold in a steady-state version of the model. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20487 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20487 ppn:360941273 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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