Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20487

Full metadata record

DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Albrecht, James	-
dc.creator	Gautier, Pieter A.	-
dc.creator	Vroman, Susan	-
dc.date	2003	-
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-16T07:10:45Z	-
dc.date.available	2013-10-16T07:10:45Z	-
dc.date.issued	2013-10-16	-
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20487	-
dc.identifier	ppn:360941273	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20487	-
dc.description	We analyze a model of directed search in which unemployed job seekers observe all posted wages. We allow for the possibility of multiple applications by workers and ex post competition among vacancies. For any number of applications, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which vacancies post a common wage. When workers apply to only one vacancy, a single wage is paid and the resulting equilibrium is efficient. When workers make multiple applications, there is dispersion in wages paid, and equilibrium may be inefficient. We show that our results also hold in a steady-state version of the model.	-
dc.language	eng	-
dc.relation	IZA Discussion paper series 719	-
dc.rights	http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen	-
dc.subject	J41	-
dc.subject	D83	-
dc.subject	J64	-
dc.subject	ddc:330	-
dc.subject	job search	-
dc.subject	directed search	-
dc.subject	matching	-
dc.subject	Arbeitsplatzsuchmodell	-
dc.subject	Offene Stellen	-
dc.subject	Matching	-
dc.subject	Lohntheorie	-
dc.subject	Theorie	-
dc.title	Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications	-
dc.type	doc-type:workingPaper	-
Appears in Collections:	EconStor

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