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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20524Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Gautier, Pieter A. | - |
| dc.creator | Moraga-González, José Luis | - |
| dc.date | 2004 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-10-16T07:10:55Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-10-16T07:10:55Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-10-16 | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20524 | - |
| dc.identifier | ppn:395918529 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20524 | - |
| dc.description | We examine wage competition in a model where identical workers choose the number of jobs to apply for and identical firms simultaneously post a wage. The Nash equilibrium of this game exhibits the following properties: (i) an equilibrium where workers apply for just one job exhibits unemployment and absence of wage dispersion; (ii) an equilibrium where workers apply for two or for more (but not for all) jobs always exhibits wage dispersion and, typically, unemployment; (iii) the equilibrium wage distribution with a higher vacancy-to-unemployment ratio first-order stochastically dominates the wage distribution with a lower level of labor market tightness; (iv) the average wage is non-monotonic in the number of applications; (v) the equilibrium number of applications is non-monotonic in the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio; (vi) a minimum wage increase can be welfare improving because it compresses the wage distribution and reduces the congestion effects caused by the socially excessive number of applications; and (vii) the only way to obtain efficiency is to impose a mandatory wage that eliminates wage dispersion altogether. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.relation | IZA Discussion paper series 1260 | - |
| dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | - |
| dc.subject | J64 | - |
| dc.subject | J41 | - |
| dc.subject | D4 | - |
| dc.subject | ddc:330 | - |
| dc.subject | coordination frictions | - |
| dc.subject | internet | - |
| dc.subject | job search | - |
| dc.subject | minimum wage | - |
| dc.subject | wage dispersion | - |
| dc.subject | Lohnbildung | - |
| dc.subject | Lohnverhandlungen | - |
| dc.subject | Nash-Gleichgewicht | - |
| dc.subject | Lohnverhandlungstheorie | - |
| dc.subject | Arbeitsuche | - |
| dc.subject | Theorie | - |
| dc.title | Strategic Wage Setting and Coordination Frictions with Multiple Applications | - |
| dc.type | doc-type:workingPaper | - |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor | |
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