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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20564Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Roider, Andreas | - |
| dc.date | 2004 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-10-16T07:11:10Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-10-16T07:11:10Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-10-16 | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20564 | - |
| dc.identifier | ppn:464451868 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20564 | - |
| dc.description | The present paper aims to contribute to the literature on the foundations of incomplete contracts by providing conditions under which simple delegation of authority is the solution to the complete-contracting problem of the parties. We consider a hold-up framework where both parties profit from an investment that raises the value of an asset. Delegation turns out to be optimal if (i) the decision-dependent parts of the payoffs of the parties are linear in the asset value, and (ii) decisions have no investment-independent effect. If overinvestment might be an issue, delegation, however, with restricted competencies is optimal if some additional continuity requirements are met. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | - | |
| dc.relation | IZA Discussion paper series 1298 | - |
| dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | - |
| dc.subject | L14 | - |
| dc.subject | D23 | - |
| dc.subject | D82 | - |
| dc.subject | L22 | - |
| dc.subject | ddc:330 | - |
| dc.subject | delegation | - |
| dc.subject | decentralization | - |
| dc.subject | authority | - |
| dc.subject | incomplete contracts | - |
| dc.subject | hold-up | - |
| dc.subject | property rights | - |
| dc.subject | Kooperative Führung | - |
| dc.subject | Dezentrale Organisation | - |
| dc.subject | Unvollständiger Vertrag | - |
| dc.subject | Eigentumsrechtstheorie | - |
| dc.subject | Investition | - |
| dc.subject | Sunk Costs | - |
| dc.subject | Theorie | - |
| dc.title | Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)complete Contract | - |
| dc.type | doc-type:workingPaper | - |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor | |
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