Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20609| Title: | Incentives in Tournaments with Endogenous Prize Selection |
| Keywords: | J41 J33 D23 C72 L23 ddc:330 relative performance evaluation personnel economics sabotage reciprocity experiments Leistungsanreiz Wettbewerb Agency Theory Wirtschaftskriminalität Experiment Tournament |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | |
| Description: | Tournament incentive schemes offer payments dependent on relative performance and thereby are intended to motivate agents to exert productive effort. Unfortunately, however, an agent may also be tempted to destroy the production of his competitors in order to improve the own relative position. In the present study we investigate whether this sabotage problem is mitigated in a repeated interaction between the agents and the principal. As sabotage can hardly be observed in real-world organizations we employ a controlled experiment. Our data provide clear evidence that agents? behavior is not only guided by competition between agents but also by the possibility to punish the principal via sabotage. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20609 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20609 ppn:474242978 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.