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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/2787| Title: | Can insider power affect employment? |
| Keywords: | J42 J64 E24 J23 J31 ddc:330 insider power employment labor demand wage differentials Lohnstruktur Insider-Outsider-Modell Arbeitsuche Anspruchslohn Marktmacht Theorie |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit Bonn |
| Description: | Do firms reduce employment when their insiders (established, incumbent employees) claim higher wages? The conventional answer in the theoretical literature is that insider power has no influence on employment, provided that the newly hired employees (entrants) receive their reservation wages. The reason given is that an increase in insider wages gives rise to a counterveiling fall in reservation wages, leaving the present value of wage costs unchanged. Our analysis contradicts this conventional answer. We show that, in the context of a stochastic model of the labor market, an increase in insider wages promotes firming in recessions, while leaving hiring in booms unchanged. Thereby insider power reduces average employment. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/2787 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/2787 ppn:351399518 ppn:351399518 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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