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| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Klodt, Henning | - |
| dc.date | 1996 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-10-16T06:27:52Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-10-16T06:27:52Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-10-16 | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/908 | - |
| dc.identifier | ppn:216620864 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/908 | - |
| dc.description | A mandatory open-network-provision (ONP) by dominant firms is the appropriate government regulation in the presence of network externalities. For basic telephone services and online services, a permanent ONP regulation seems indispensable, whereas telecommunication networks only require transitional ONP regulation as long as public or privatized PTTs dispose of a dominant market position. Regulatory institutions tend to prefer either cost-plus or price-cap contracts for defining appropriate price-ceilings for network-access under ONP regulation. In order to avoid the specific disadvantages of both, governments should better apply incentive contract schemes which allow a sharing of efficiency gains among producers and customers. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Kiel | - |
| dc.relation | Kiel Working Papers 766 | - |
| dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | - |
| dc.subject | D82 | - |
| dc.subject | L51 | - |
| dc.subject | L96 | - |
| dc.subject | ddc:330 | - |
| dc.subject | Telekommunikationspolitik | - |
| dc.subject | Telekommunikationsinfrastruktur | - |
| dc.subject | Netzzugang | - |
| dc.subject | Markteintritt | - |
| dc.subject | Regulierung | - |
| dc.subject | Theorie | - |
| dc.title | Regulating network-based industries : the case of telecommunications | - |
| dc.type | doc-type:workingPaper | - |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor | |
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