A simultaneous descending bid auction for multiple items and unitary demand

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/123456789/4192

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Sotomayor Marilda	-
dc.date	2002	-
dc.date.accessioned	2013-05-30T10:47:23Z	-
dc.date.available	2013-05-30T10:47:23Z	-
dc.date.issued	2013-05-30	-
dc.identifier	http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-71402002000300006	-
dc.identifier	http://www.doaj.org/doaj?func=openurl&genre=article&issn=00347140&date=2002&volume=56&issue=3&spage=497	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/jspui/handle/123456789/4192	-
dc.description	This paper proposes a new descending bid method for auctioning multiple objects. The auctioneer announces a current price, bidders indicate their demands at that price, and the auctioneer lowers the prices until every object can be allocated to a buyer who demands it and no buyer receives more than one item. The features of this mechanism lie on the facts that: the objects are sold simultaneously at prices that clear the market; every two similar objects are sold at the same price; the mechanism always produces the same final price, namely, the maximum competitive equilibrium price. In addition, the auctioneer can choose an efficient allocation.	-
dc.publisher	Fundação Getúlio Vargas	-
dc.source	Revista Brasileira de Economia	-
dc.subject	auction mechanism	-
dc.subject	competitive equilibrium	-
dc.subject	demand set	-
dc.title	A simultaneous descending bid auction for multiple items and unitary demand	-
Appears in Collections:	Business and Economics

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