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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/123456789/4192| Title: | A simultaneous descending bid auction for multiple items and unitary demand |
| Keywords: | auction mechanism competitive equilibrium demand set |
| Issue Date: | 30-May-2013 |
| Publisher: | Fundação Getúlio Vargas |
| Description: | This paper proposes a new descending bid method for auctioning multiple objects. The auctioneer announces a current price, bidders indicate their demands at that price, and the auctioneer lowers the prices until every object can be allocated to a buyer who demands it and no buyer receives more than one item. The features of this mechanism lie on the facts that: the objects are sold simultaneously at prices that clear the market; every two similar objects are sold at the same price; the mechanism always produces the same final price, namely, the maximum competitive equilibrium price. In addition, the auctioneer can choose an efficient allocation. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/jspui/handle/123456789/4192 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-71402002000300006 http://www.doaj.org/doaj?func=openurl&genre=article&issn=00347140&date=2002&volume=56&issue=3&spage=497 |
| Appears in Collections: | Business and Economics |
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