Draft constitution and the decision-making rule for the Council of Ministers of the EU   Looking for alternative solution

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/123456789/6051

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Bela Plechanovová	-
dc.date	2004	-
dc.date.accessioned	2013-05-30T14:09:24Z	-
dc.date.available	2013-05-30T14:09:24Z	-
dc.date.issued	2013-05-30	-
dc.identifier	http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-012.htm	-
dc.identifier	http://www.doaj.org/doaj?func=openurl&genre=article&issn=10275193&date=2004&volume=8&issue=&spage=12	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/jspui/handle/123456789/6051	-
dc.description	A priori voting power analysis can provide an effective tool for assessment of decision-making rules, which is particularly needed in procedures using weighted voting. The Council of the EU is such a case and the decision-making rule for this main decision-making body is a long-lasting problem of the European Union. This article aims at designing an equitable and politically acceptable solution to this problem while at the same time provides a comparison of the qualities of the proposed rule with the rule as given by the Treaty of Nice, by the Draft Treaty on Constitution and by another proposal, which was presented as an optimal solution.	-
dc.publisher	ECSA-Austria	-
dc.source	European Integration Online Papers	-
dc.subject	Nice Treaty	-
dc.subject	Constitution for Europe	-
dc.subject	Council of Ministers	-
dc.subject	qualified majority	-
dc.subject	majority voting	-
dc.subject	political science	-
dc.title	Draft constitution and the decision-making rule for the Council of Ministers of the EU Looking for alternative solution	-
Appears in Collections:	Law and Political Science

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