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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/1721.1/6376Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Batali, John | - |
| dc.date | 2004-10-04T14:54:01Z | - |
| dc.date | 2004-10-04T14:54:01Z | - |
| dc.date | 1983-02-01 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-10-09T02:45:00Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-10-09T02:45:00Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-10-09 | - |
| dc.identifier | AIM-701 | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/6376 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/1721 | - |
| dc.description | Introspection is the process of thinking about one's own thoughts and feelings. In this paper, I discuss recent attempts to make computational systems that exhibit introspective behavior: [Smith, 982], [Weyhrauch, 1978], and [Doyle, 1980]. Each presents a system capable of manipulating representations of its own program and current context. I argue that introspective ability is crucial for intelligent systems ??thout it an agent cannot represent certain problems that it must be able to solve. A theory of intelligent action would describe how and why certain actions intelligently achieve an agent's goals. The agent would both embody and represent this theory; it would be implemented as the program for the agent; and the importance of introspection suggests that the agent represent its theory of action to itself. | - |
| dc.format | 11203946 bytes | - |
| dc.format | 8820228 bytes | - |
| dc.format | application/postscript | - |
| dc.format | application/pdf | - |
| dc.language | en_US | - |
| dc.relation | AIM-701 | - |
| dc.title | Computational Introspection | - |
| Appears in Collections: | MIT Items | |
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